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TOEHOLD PURCHASE PROBLEM:
A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF TWO STRATEGIES
I. BANAKH, T. BANAKH, M. VOVK, P. TRISCH
Abstract. Toehold purchase, defined here as purchase of one share in a firm by an investor preparing a tender
offer to acquire majority of shares in it, reduces by one the number of shares this investor needs for majority. In
the paper we construct mathematical models for the toehold and no-toehold strategies and compare the expected
profits of the investor and the probabilities of takeover the firm in both strategies. It turns out that the expected
profits of the investor in both strategies coincide. On the other hand, the probability of takeover the firm using
the toehold strategy is considerably higher comparing to the no-toehold strategy. In the analysis of the models
we apply the apparatus of incomplete Beta functions and some refined bounds for central binomial coefficients.
1. Introduction
This paper is about the toehold purchase problem. By a toehold we mean either the number or the fraction
of shares owned by an outside investor considering or preparing a tender offer to acquire majority of shares and
take over. By a tender offer we mean a proposal made by an investor to shareholders to tender their shares,
with the hope to obtain majority of shares and take over. At the time of such an offer, an investor may already
own, say, one-share-toehold. In our model the firm is going to be widely held and each shareholder will own
one share. Outside investor will make a tender offer to all shareholders if s/he does not own a toehold and to
all shareholders excluding self when s/he does own a toehold. For our purposes we consider the terms ‘tender
offer’ and ‘bid’ as synonyms. Sometimes there is an upper bound on the number of possible stake (shareholding)
that the outside investor may hold at the time s/he places a tender offer. Here surfaces one of the questions
of toehold literature. If an investor is allowed to hold only a certain fraction of shares when s/he wishes to
place a tender offer (but not more), would s/he always want to hold this maximum possible stake? If not, why
not? Probably with this question in mind, a number of toehold theories look at optimal toeholds in a variety of
settings and under variety of assumptions about market structure, ownership structure (how many shares each
shareholder owns), information structure or the number of investors (one, two or more); see Grossman, Hart
[13], Bagnoli, Lipman [3], [4], Singh [17], Ravid, Spiegel [15], Betton, Eckbo [6], Bris [8], Goldman, Qian [12],
Ettinger [11], Betton, Eckbo, Thorburn [7], Chatterjee, John, Yan [9].
Our approach is different in that we specifically assume that there is only one investor who is considering
a tender offer and that if this investor does decide to purchase a toehold then s/he purchases only one share.
If there is no toehold, then our assumptions follow the lines of Bagnoli and Lipman [3]. If investor purchases
a toehold, then the circumstances of the tender offer are different. The difference does not only lie in the fact
that the offer is made to one fewer shareholders. In this case investor’s tender offer might (and generally would)
take into account the effect of potential takeover on the worth of a toehold. Our setting is rudimentary in that
there are no asymmetries of information, toehold is one share and key to toehold purchase is either yes or no
answer. The two strategies (no-toehold and toehold) of the outside investor are described in Section 2. The
main results of Section 2 are Theorems 1 and 2. In Theorem 1 we calculate the principal parameters of the
non-toehold strategy: the price of a share X0 suggested by the investor in the tender offer, the probability σ0
that a shareholder will sell her/his share to the investor, the probability P0 of takeover the firm, and the expected
profit Π0 of the investor. In Theorem 2 we calculate the respective parameters X1, σ1, P1, Π1 for the toehold
strategy. Comparing the obtained formulas for these parameters we discovered that both strategies yield the
same expected profit Π1 = Π0 and the same probability σ0 = σ1 that a shareholder will sell her/his share to the
investor. On the other hand, the probability P1 of takeover the firm using the toehold strategy is higher than the
corresponding probability P0 for the no-toehold strategy. This follows from Theorem 4 that yields some lower
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and upper bounds on the parameters Xi, Pi, Πi, i ∈ {0, 1}, of our models. The proof of Theorem 4 (presented in
Appendix) is not trivial and uses the mathematical apparatus of incomplete beta functions and some non-trivial
bounds on the central binomial coefficients. In Section 4 we make some mathematical conclusions that follow
from the analysis of our models.
2. Models
We assume that a firm has 2n+ 1 shareholders. Each shareholder owns one share. The worth of each share,
if the firm continues to be run by incumbent management, is normalized to 0. There is also an outside investor
B who is considering takeover bid. If investor takes over, the value of each share is increased to 1.
Now we consider two strategies of the investor B who is willing to take over the firm buying a majority of
shares.
0. The first strategy will be referred to as the no-toehold strategy and its parameters will be labeled by the
subscript 0. Following the no-toehold strategy, the investor B makes a tender offer to all 2n + 1 shareholders
suggesting a price X for each share. Shareholders decide independently whether to accept or to reject the tender
offer. They may use mixed strategies, i.e. accept the offer with certain probability σ. Simple majority of n+ 1
shares is necessary for takeover. Tender offer is unconditional in the sense that if less than n shareholder accept
the tender offer, then B has to purchase shares from those shareholders who accepted the offer, even though in
that case B becomes a minority shareholder, the worth of each share value remains at 0 and such purchase is
ex post unprofitable for B as long as X > 0.
Suppose shareholders use symmetric mixed strategies, in which in response to tender offer X all of them
accept the tender offer with probability σ ∈ (0, 1) and reject it with probability (1− σ). For the pair (X, σ) to
be equilibrial, each shareholder has to be indifferent between tendering and not tendering her share, or otherwise
she would not use mixing strategy. If she tenders, she ends up with X , and if she does not, her unsold stake
is worth more than 0 if among remaining 2n shareholders at least n+ 1 shareholders tender their shares. That
happens with probability
∑2n
k=n+1
(
2n
k
)
σk(1−σ)2n−k. In that case the firm is taken over. A shareholder who did
not tender her share remains a minority shareholder who “free-rides” on investor’s improvement in firm value
from 0 to 1. So the pair (X, σ) can be a suspect for a symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium only if
(1) X =
2n∑
k=n+1
(
2n
k
)
σk(1− σ)2n−k.
Here by (
n
k
)
=
n!
k!(n− k)!
we denote the binomial coefficients.
The investor’s expected profit Π is calculated using three variables: the number of tendered shares, probability
that exactly that many shares are tendered, and the share value:
Π = (0−X)
n∑
k=1
k
(
2n+1
k
)
σk(1− σ)2n+1−k + (1−X)
2n+1∑
k=n+1
k
(
2n+1
k
)
σk(1− σ)2n+1−k.
After a suitable rearrangement and substituting for X the sum (1) we obtain:
Π =
2n+1∑
k=n+1
(
2n+1
k
)
k σk(1 − σ)2n+1−k −X
2n+1∑
k=1
(
2n+1
k
)
k σk(1− σ)2n+1−k =
= (2n+1)
2n+1∑
k=n+1
(
2n
k−1
)
σk(1−σ)2n+1−k−X(2n+1)
2n+1∑
k=1
(
2n
k−1
)
σk(1−σ)2n+1−k =
= (2n+1)
2n∑
k=n
(
2n
k
)
σk+1(1 − σ)2n−k −X(2n+1)σ
2n∑
k=0
(
2n
k
)
σk(1− σ)2n−k =
= (2n+1)
2n∑
k=n
(
2n
k
)
σk+1(1 − σ)2n−k − (2n+1)σX(σ + (1 − σ))2n =
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= (2n+1)
2n∑
k=n
(
2n
k
)
σk+1(1− σ)2n−k − (2n+1)σX =
= (2n+1)
2n∑
k=n
(
2n
k
)
σk+1(1− σ)2n−k − (2n+1)σ
2n∑
k=n+1
(
2n
k
)
σk(1 − σ)2n−k =
= (2n+1)
2n∑
k=n
(
2n
k
)
σk+1(1− σ)2n−k − (2n+1)
2n∑
k=n+1
(
2n
k
)
σk+1(1− σ)2n−k =
= (2n+ 1)
(
2n
n
)
σn+1(1 − σ)n.
The maximal value
Π0 = (2n+ 1)
(
2n
n
)
σn+10 (1 − σ0)n =
(
2n
n
) (n+ 1)n+1nn
(2n+ 1)2n
of the profit of the investor is attained for the probability
σ0 =
n+ 1
2n+ 1
that corresponds to the price of a share
X0 =
2n∑
k=n+1
(
2n
k
)
σk0 (1− σ0)2n−k =
2n∑
k=n+1
(
2n
k
) (n+ 1)kn2n−k
(2n+ 1)2n
.
In this situation the probability of takeover the firm by the investor equals
P0 =
2n+1∑
k=n+1
(
2n+1
k
)
σk0 (1− σ0)2n+1−k =
2n+1∑
k=n+1
(
2n+1
k
) (n+ 1)kn2n+1−k
(2n+ 1)2n+1
.
The no-toehold strategy will be denoted by S0. We summarize our description of this strategy in the following:
Theorem 1. If the investor uses the no-toehold strategy S0 to take over a firm with (2n+1) shareholders, then
he should offer the price
X0 =
2n∑
k=n+1
(
2n
k
) (n+ 1)kn2n−k
(2n+ 1)2n
for a share in the tender offer and can expect to take over the firm with probability
P0 =
2n+1∑
k=n+1
(
2n+1
k
) (n+ 1)kn2n+1−k
(2n+ 1)2n+1
and expect for the profit
Π0 =
(
2n
n
) (n+ 1)n+1nn
(2n+ 1)2n
.
To maximize their expected profit the shareholders should sell their shares to the investor with probability
σ0 =
n+ 1
2n+ 1
.
1. Now we consider a more complex strategy S1 called the toehold strategy. Following this strategy the
investor B first tries to purchase one-share toehold from a shareholder A who is aware that B is about to launch
a tender offer to acquire majority of shares suggesting the price X0 for a share. We assume that A is the only
shareholder from whom B is able to purchase a toehold, and A agrees to sell her share to the investor B for the
price X0.
After buying the toehold from the shareholder A, the investor announces a post-toehold tender offer to the
remaining 2n shareholders, offering a price X1 for a share. If σ1 is the probability that a shareholder will tender
her share for that price, then the equilibrium will occur if
X1 =
2n−1∑
k=n
(
2n−1
k
)
σk1 (1 − σ1)2n−1−k,
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which is equal to the probability that among 2n− 1 shareholders at least n will sell their shares.
The probability of takeover the firm in the post toehold tender is equal to
P1 =
2n∑
k=n
(
2n
k
)
σk1 (1− σ1)2n−k
and the expected profit Π1 of the investor for the toehold strategy is equal to
Π1 = (−X0+1 · P1)+(0−X1)
n−1∑
k=1
k
(
2n
k
)
σk1 (1−σ1)2n−k+(1−X1)
2n∑
k=n
k
(
2n
k
)
σk1 (1−σ1)2n−k =
= (−X0+P1)−X12nσ1
2n∑
k=1
(
2n−1
k−1
)
σk−11 (1−σ1)2n−k+2nσ1
2n∑
k=n
(
2n−1
k−1
)
σk−11 (1−σ1)2n−k =
= (−X0+P1)−2nσ1X1
2n−1∑
k=0
(
2n−1
k
)
σk1 (1−σ1)2n−k−1+2nσ1
2n−1∑
k=n−1
(
2n−1
k
)
σk1 (1−σ1)2n−k−1 =
= (−X0 + P1)− 2nσ1X1(σ1 + (1− σ1))2n−1 + 2nσ1
2n−1∑
k=n−1
(
2n−1
k
)
σk1 (1− σ1)2n−k−1 =
= (−X0+P1)−2nσ1
2n−1∑
k=n
(
2n−1
k
)
σk1 (1−σ1)2n−1−k+2nσ1
2n−1∑
k=n−1
(
2n−1
k
)
σk1 (1−σ1)2n−k−1 =
= (−X0 + P1) + 2n
(
2n−1
n−1
)
σn1 (1− σ1)n = (−X0 + P1) + n
(
2n
n
)
σn1 (1− σ1)n =
= −X0 +
2n∑
k=n
(
2n
k
)
σk1 (1− σ1)2n−k + n
(
2n
n
)
σn1 (1− σ1)n.
To find the maximal value of the expected profit Π1, consider the derivative
dΠ1
dσ1
=
d
dσ1
σ2n1 +
d
dσ1
2n−1∑
k=n
(
2n
k
)
σk1 (1− σ1)2n−k +
d
dσ1
n
(
2n
n
)
σn1 (1− σ1)n =
= 2nσ2n−11 +
2n−1∑
k=n
(
2n
k
)(
kσk−11 (1−σ1)2n−k − (2n− k)σk1 (1−σ1)2n−k−1
)
+ n2
(
2n
n
)
σn−11 (1−σ1)n−1(1−2σ1) =
=
2n∑
k=n
2n
(
2n−1
k−1
)
σk−11 (1− σ1)2n−k −
2n−1∑
k=n
2n
(
2n−1
k
)
σk1 (1 − σ1)2n−1−k + n2
(
2n
n
)
σn−11 (1− σ1)n−1(1 − 2σ1) =
=
2n−1∑
k=n−1
2n
(
2n−1
k
)
σk1 (1−σ1)2n−k−1 −
2n−1∑
k=n
2n
(
2n−1
k
)
σk1 (1−σ1)2n−1−k + n2
(
2n
n
)
σn−11 (1−σ1)n−1(1− 2σ1) =
= 2n
(
2n−1
n−1
)
σn−11 (1− σ1)n + n2
(
2n
n
)
σn−11 (1− σ1)n−1(1− 2σ1) =
= n
(
2n
n
)
σn−11 (1 − σ1)n−1(1− σ1) + n2
(
2n
n
)
σn−11 (1 − σ1)n−1(1− 2σ1) =
= n
(
2n
n
)
σn−11 (1 − σ1)n−1
(
1− σ1 + n(1− 2σ1)
)
and observe that it is equal to zero at σ1 =
n+1
2n+1 = σ0.
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So, for σ1 = σ0 =
n+1
2n+1 the expected profit Π1 attains its maximal value
Π1 = −X0 +
2n∑
k=n
(
2n
k
)
σk1 (1− σ1)2n−k + n
(
2n
n
)
σn1 (1− σ1)n =
= −
2n∑
k=n+1
(
2n
k
)
σk0 (1− σ0)2n−k +
2n∑
k=n
(
2n
k
)
σk1 (1− σ1)2n−k + n
(
2n
n
)
σn1 (1− σ1)n =
=
(
2n
n
)
σn1 (1 − σ1)n + n
(
2n
n
)
σn1 (1− σ1)n = (n+ 1)
(
2n
n
) (n+ 1)nnn
(2n+ 1)2n
= Π0.
The above discussion can be summed up in:
Theorem 2. If the investor follows the toehold strategy S1, then he buys a toehold from the shareholder A
offering the price X0 for her share and then in the post-toehold offer he offers the price
X1 =
2n−1∑
k=n
(
2n−1
k
) (n+ 1)kn2n−1−k
(2n+ 1)2n−1
for a share, in which case the shareholders will sell their shares with probability
σ1 =
n+ 1
2n+ 1
= σ0,
the investor can takeover the firm with probability
P1 =
2n∑
k=n
(
2n
k
) (n+ 1)kn2n−k
(2n+ 1)2n
and can expect for the profit
Π1 =
(
2n
n
) (n+ 1)n+1nn
(2n+ 1)2n
= Π0.
As we see from Theorems 1, 2, the no-toehold and toehold strategies yield the same profit Π0 = Π1 and the
same probability σ0 = σ1 =
n+1
2n+1 of selling their shares by the shareholders in the tender offers. On the other
hand, the prices for a share and the probabilities P0 and P1 of takeover the firm are different for these two
strategies. The precise estimate of the differences P1 − P0 and X1 −X0 will be given in Corollary 1. Now, let
us consider a simple example.
2.1. A firm with 3 shareholders. In case of 3-shareholders (which corresponds to n = 1) the values of all
parameters from Theorems 1 and 2 can be easily calculated:
• σ0 = 2/3 is the probability that shareholders will sell their shares to the investor for the price:
• X0 = 4/9 suggested by the investor in the no-toehold strategy,
• P0 = 20/27 is the probability of taking over the firm in no-toehold strategy;
• Π0 = 8/9 is the expected profit of the investor in the no-toehold strategy;
• σ1 = 2/3 is the probability that a shareholder will tender her share to the investor for the price:
• X1 = 2/3 suggested by the investor in the post-toehold tender offer,
• P1 = 8/9 is the probability of taking over the firm in the toehold strategy,
• Π1 = 8/9 is the expected profit of the investor in the toehold strategy.
Looking at these data, we see that both strategies yield the same profit but the toehold strategy is much better
than the no-toehold strategy in the sense of probability of takeover the firm.
It turns out that the same situation happens for all n ∈ N, see Corollary 1 below. In this corollary we shall
prove that the difference P1 − P0 of probabilities for the toehold and no-toehold strategies is strictly positive
and has order P1 − P0 ≈ 12√pin .
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3. Explicit analytic expressions for the parameters of the models
For deriving the lower and upper bounds presented in Theorem 4 we shall transform the binomial sums
appearing in the expressions of the parameters of our models and obtain precise analytic formulas for these
parameters, after which we shall evaluate them using some bounds on central binomial coefficients and simple
bounds giving by Taylor series. Our principal tool in finding explicit analytic expressions for the parameters of
the model is use of incomplete beta functions.
By definition, the beta function is the function
B(a, b) =
∫ 1
0
ta−1(1 − t)b−1dt
depending on two real positive parameters a, b. For fixed a, b the function
Bx(a, b) =
∫ x
0
ta−1(1 − t)b−1dt
on the variable x ∈ [0, 1] is called the incomplete beta function. A remarkable property of the incomplete beta
function is that for positive integer numbers a, b its value is proportional to a tail of the binomial series:
(2)
a+b−1∑
k=a
(
a+b−1
k
)
xk(1 − x)a+b−1−k = a(a+b−1a )Bx(a, b) = a(a+b−1a )
∫ x
0
ta−1(1 − t)b−1dt
This equality plays a fundamental role in our subsequent arguments and will be referred to as the beta-equality.
For the proof of the beta-equality and other information on (incomplete) beta functions, we refer the reader to
the survey paper of Dutka [10].
Beta functions will be used in the proof of the following theorem that gives explicit analytic formulas for the
parameters describing the no-toehold and toehold strategies.
Theorem 3. The parameters of the models can be calculated by the following formulas:
(1) The price X0 =
∑2n
k=n+1
(
2n
k
) (n+1)kn2n−k
(2n+1)2n suggested by the investor in the no-toehold strategy can be
found by the formula
X0 =
1
2
− 1
22n+1
(
2n
n
)(
1− 1
(2n+ 1)2
)n
+
n
22n
(
2n
n
) ∫ 12n+1
0
(1− t2)n−1dt.
(2) The probability P0 =
∑2n+1
k=n+1
(
2n+1
k
) (n+1)kn2n+1−k
(2n+1)2n+1 of taking over the firm in the no-toehold strategy can
be found as
P0 =
1
2
+
(2n+ 1)
22n+1
(
2n
n
) ∫ 12n+1
0
(1− t2)ndt.
(3) The expected profits Π0 = Π1 =
(
2n
n
)nn(n+1)n+1
(2n+1)2n of the investor can be found by
Π0 = Π1 =
(n+ 1)
22n
(
2n
n
)(
1− 1
(2n+ 1)2
)n
.
(4) The probability P1 =
∑2n
k=n
(
2n
k
) (n+1)kn2n−k
(2n+1)2n of takeover the firm in the post-toehold strategy is equal to
P1 =
1
2
+
1
22n+1
(
2n
n
)(
1− 1
(2n+ 1)2
)n
+
n
22n
(
2n
n
) ∫ 12n+1
0
(1− t2)n−1dt.
(5) The price X1 =
∑2n−1
k=n
(
2n−1
k
) (n+1)kn2n−1−k
(2n+1)2n−1 for a share offered by the investor in the post-toehold tender
offer can be calculated as
X1 =
1
2
+
n
22n
(
2n
n
) ∫ 1(2n+1)
0
(1− t2)n−1dt.
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Proof. 1. To deduce the formula for the price X0, we use the beta-equality (2) with parameters a = n+ 1 and
b = n. In this case we get the equality
(3)
2n∑
k=n+1
(
2n
k
)
xk(1− x)2n−k = (n+ 1)( 2nn+1)
∫ x
0
tn(1− t)n−1dt = = n(2nn )
∫ x
0
tn(1− t)n−1dt.
For x = 12 , this equality turns into:
(4) n
(
2n
n
) ∫ 12
0
tn(1− t)n−1 =
2n∑
k=n+1
(
2n
k
) 1
22n
=
1
2
(
− (2nn ) 122n +
2n∑
k=0
(
2n
k
) 1
22n
)
=
1
2
(
1− (2nn ) 122n
)
because
2n∑
k=0
(
2n
k
) 1
22n
=
(1
2
+
1
2
)n
= 1.
Then (3) can be written as:
2n∑
k=n+1
(
2n
k
)
xk(1− x)2n−k = n(2nn )
(∫ 1/2
0
tn(1 − t)n−1dt+
∫ x
1/2
tn(1− t)n−1dt
)
=
=
1
2
− 1
22n+1
(
2n
n
)
+ n
(
2n
n
) ∫ x− 12
0
(12 + u)
n(12 − u)n−1du =
=
1
2
− 1
22n+1
(
2n
n
)
+ n
(
2n
n
) ∫ x− 12
0
(12 + u)(
1
4 − u2)n−1du =
=
1
2
− 1
22n+1
(
2n
n
)
+ n
(
2n
n
)(1
2
∫ x− 12
0
(14 − u2)n−1du−
1
2
∫ x− 12
0
(14 − u2)n−1d(14 − u2)
)
=
=
1
2
− 1
22n+1
(
2n
n
)
+
n
22n−1
(
2n
n
) ∫ x− 12
0
(1− (2u)2)n−1du− 1
2
(
2n
n
)(
(x− x2)n − 14n ) =
=
1
2
+
n
22n
(
2n
n
) ∫ 2x−1
0
(1− t2)n−1dt− 1
2
(
2n
n
)
xn(1− x)n.
For x = σ0 =
1
2 +
1
2(2n+1) the latter formula yields the required formula for the price X0:
X0 =
2n∑
k=n+1
(
2n
k
)
σk0 (1 − σ0)2n−k =
1
2
− 1
22n+1
(
2n
n
)(
1− 1
(2n+ 1)2
)n
+
n
22n
(
2n
n
) ∫ 12n+1
0
(1− t2)n−1dt.
2. By analogy we deduce the formula for the probability
P0 =
2n+1∑
k=n+1
(
2n+1
k
) (n+ 1)kn2n+1−k
(2n+ 1)2n+1
of takeover the firm in the no-toehold strategy. Writing down the beta-equality (2) for the parameters a = n+1
and b = n+ 1, we get
(5)
2n+1∑
k=n+1
(
2n+1
k
)
xk(1− x)2n+1−k = (n+ 1)(2n+1n+1 )
∫ x
0
tn(1− t)ndt.
For x = 12 , this equality turns into:
(n+ 1)
(
2n+1
n+1
) ∫ 12
0
tn(1− t)n =
2n+1∑
k=n+1
(
2n+1
k
) 1
22n+1
=
1
2
.
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After suitable rearrangements, for x = σ0 =
n+1
2n+1 the equality (5) transforms into the desired equality:
P0 =
2n+1∑
k=n+1
(
2n+1
k
)
xk(1− x)2n+1−k = (n+ 1)(2n+1n+1 )
(∫ 1/2
0
tn(1− t)ndt+
∫ x
1/2
tn(1− t)ndt
)
=
=
1
2
+ (n+ 1)
(
2n+1
n+1
) ∫ x−1/2
0
(12 + u)
n(12 − u)ndu =
1
2
+
(2n+ 1)
22n+1
(
2n
n
) ∫ 2x−1
0
(1− t2)ndt =
=
1
2
+
(2n+ 1)
22n+1
(
2n
n
) ∫ 12n+1
0
(1− t2)ndt.
3. The formula for the profits Π0 = Π1 =
(
2n
n
)nn(n+1)n+1
(2n+1)2n follows from the observation that
n2 + n
(2n+ 1)2
=
1
4
(
1− 1
(2n+ 1)2
)
.
4. Taking into account that σ1 = σ0 =
n+1
2n+1 and looking at the formula for X0 proved in Theorem 3(1), we
see that
P1 =
2n∑
k=n
(
2n
k
)
σk1 (1− σ1)2n−k =
(
2n
n
)
σn1 (1 − σ1)n +X0 =
=
1
22n
(
2n
n
)(
1− 1
(2n+ 1)2
)n
+
1
2
− 1
22n+1
(
2n
n
)(
1− 1
(2n+ 1)2
)n
+
n
22n
(
2n
n
) ∫ 12n+1
0
(1− t2)n−1dt =
=
1
2
+
1
22n+1
(
2n
n
)(
1− 1
(2n+ 1)2
)n
+
n
22n
(
2n
n
) ∫ 12n+1
0
(1− t2)n−1dt.
5. The beta-equation (2) written for a = n and b = n yields:
X1 =
2n−1∑
k=n
(
2n−1
k
)
σk1 (1− σ1)2n−1−k = n
(
2n−1
n
) ∫ σ1
0
tn−1(1− t)n−1dt =
= n
(
2n−1
n
) ∫ 12
0
tn−1(1− t)n−1dt+ n(2n−1n )
∫ σ1− 12
1
2
tn−1(1− t)n−1dt =
=
2n−1∑
k=n
(
2n−1
k
) 1
22n−1
+ n
(
2n−1
n
) ∫ 12(2n+1)
0
(12 + u)
n−1(12 − u)n−1du =
=
1
2
2n−1∑
k=0
(
2n−1
k
) 1
22n−1
+
n
2
(
2n
n
) ∫ 12(2n+1)
0
(14 − u2)n−1du =
=
1
2
+
n
22n−1
(
2n
n
) ∫ 12(2n+1)
0
(1 − 4u2)n−1du = 1
2
+
n
22n
(
2n
n
) ∫ 1(2n+1)
0
(1 − t2)n−1dt.

Using the formulas from Theorem 3, one can derive the following lower and upper bounds for the parameters
of our models, see [2] for details.
Theorem 4. The parameters of the models lie in the following intervals:
X0:
1
2
+
1√
pin
(
− 1
6n
− 1
64n2
)
< X0 <
1
2
+
1√
pin
(
− 1
6n
+
5
24n2
)
,
X1:
1
2
+
1√
pin
(1
2
− 5
16n
+
1
48n2
)
< X1 <
1
2
+
1√
pin
(1
2
− 5
16n
+
1
12n2
)
,
P0:
1
2
+
1√
pin
(1
2
− 5
48n
+
1
16n2
)
< P0 <
1
2
+
1√
pin
(1
2
− 5
48n
+
6
16n2
)
,
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P1:
1
2
+
1√
pin
(
1− 13
24n
+
3
16n2
)
< P1 <
1
2
+
1√
pin
(
1− 13
24n
+
4
16n2
)
,
Π0,Π1:
1√
pin
(
n+
5
8
− 1
4n
)
< Π0 = Π1 <
1√
pin
(
n+
5
8
− 1
24n
+
1
3n2
)
.
Looking at the bounds for the probabilities P0, P1 and the prices X0, X1 we can notice that P0 < P1 and
X0 < X1. An estimation of the differences P1−P0 and X1−X0 is given in the following corollary of Theorem 4.
Corollary 1.
1√
pin
·
(1
2
− 31
48n
− 3
16n2
)
< P1 − P0 < 1√
pin
·
(1
2
− 31
48n
+
3
16n2
)
and
1√
pin
·
(1
2
− 7
48n
− 3
16n2
)
< X1 −X0 < 1√
pin
·
(1
2
− 7
48n
+
1
24n2
)
.
Remark 1. The difference X1−X0 ≈ 12√pin can be interpreted as the price for the information that the investor
possesses a toehold.
The lower and upper bounds of Theorem 4 can be derived using the following lower and upper bounds for
functions appearing in the formulas in Theorem 3.
Lemma 1. For every n ∈ N and a real number x > 0 the following inequalities hold:
(1) 1− x < 1− x+ 12x2 − 16x3 < e−x < 1− x+ 12x2;
(2) 1− x < 11+x < 1− x+ x2;
(3) 1− nx < (1− x)n < 1− nx+ n(n−1)2 x2.
Lemma 2. The following lower and upper bounds hold for every n ∈ N:
(1)
1
2n
− 1
4n2
+
1
12n3
<
1
2n+ 1
<
1
2n
− 1
4n2
+
1
8n3
;
(2) 1− 1
4n
+
1
8n2
<
(
1− 1
(2n+ 1)2
)n
< 1− 1
4n
+
9
32n2
;
(3)
1
2n
− 7
24n2
+
11
48n3
<
∫ 1
2n+1
0
(1− t2)ndt < 1
2n
− 7
24n2
+
18
48n3
;
(4)
1
2n
− 7
24n2
+
5
48n3
<
∫ 1
2n+1
0
(1− t2)n−1dt < 1
2n
− 7
24n2
+
12
48n3
.
Lemma 3. The lower and upper bounds
4n√
pin
(
1− 1
8n
+
1
64n2
) <
(
2n
n
)
<
4n√
pin
(
1− 1
8n
+
1
48n2
)
hold for every n ∈ N.
These bounds on the central binomial coefficients can be derived from the following refined version of the
Stirling formula for factorials, proved in [14] and [16].
Lemma 4. For every n ≥ 1
n! =
√
2pin
(n
e
)n
ern
where
1
12n
− 1
263n3
< rn <
1
12n
.
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4. Conclusion
The analysis of our models witnesses that both strategies (toehold and no toehold) of taking over the firm
with 2n+1 shareholders yield the same profit Π0 = Π1 ≈
√
n
pi but the probability P1 ≈ 12 + 1√pin of taking over
for the toehold strategy is higher than the corresponding probability P0 ≈ 12 + 12√pin for the no-toehold strategy.
Also the equilibrium price X1 ≈ 12 + 12√pin for a share offered by the investor in the tender offer announced after
buying a toehold is higher that the corresponding price X0 ≈ 12 − 16n√pin in the tender offer without toehold.
The difference X1 −X0 ≈ 12√pin can be interpreted as the price for the information that the investor possesses
a toehold.
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